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mary judgment claiming that the exclusivity provision ofsection 15 of the
Workers' Compensation Act barred
Le's action. Section 15 states in
pertinent part that «an employer's
I iabil ity for payment of workers' compensation provided for in this statute
shall be the exclusive remedy." Id. at
1069. Federated additionally argued
that although section 44 of the Maryland Workers' Compensation Act provides an exception to the exclusivity
rule by permitting common law actions against employers for deliberate
torts, it did not apply to Le. Id.
Federated cited Maryland case law for
the proposition that an employee could
sue only if the potential tort-feasor
was the employer's «alter ego" or
acted with its express authorization.
Id. at 1070 (citing Continental Casualty Co. v. Mirabile, 449 A.2d 1176
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982)). Federated argued that because Spahr was
not its " alter ego," nor acting with its
express authority, Le's only redress
was governed by the terms of the Act.
Accepting this interpretation, the circuit court granted Federated's motion.
The court of special appeals reversed, stating that because Le's case
involved non-physical injuries, it did
not fall within the provision of the
Workers Compensation Act. Id. The
intermediate appellate court distinguished Le's case from earlier cases
on the ground that the latter dealt with
physical injuries while Le's injuries
were non-physical, thereby allowing
Le's action to proceed. Id. Federated
appealed to the court of appeals which
affirmed the intermediate court's decision on different grounds.
The court of appeals began its
analysis by interpreting the appropriate sections of the Workers' Compensation Act. Id. at 1071. The court first
reiterated the basic principal that section 44 operates as an exception to the
exclusivity requirement of section 15
and provides that an employee shall
have the " option to take benefits under
article or sue where injury or death
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results from the deliberate intention of
employer. " Id. (quoting Md. Ann.
Code art. 101 § 44 (1985 & 1990
Supp.)). The court held that the prior
decisions of the court of special appeals construed the section too narrowly by requiring that the tort-feasor
be the employer's « alter ego" or act
with its express authority. Id. at 1072.
The court of appeals declined to
adopt the " alter ego" test and allowed
Le to bring the common law suit. Id.
In support of its broad application of
section 44, the court cited decisions
which support an employee's right to
sue his employer for "some intentional torts based on the employer's
vicarious liability for the conduct of a
co-employee." Id. at 1073-74. The
court, however, decl ined to define the
parameters of the section 44 exception. Id.
The court in Federated Department Stores v. Le has significantly
broadened the interpretation of section 44 causes of action and the exclusivity exception in the Maryland Workers' Compensation Act. In so doing,
the court aligned Maryland with the
majority of other jurisdictions which
have similar exclusivity provisions
and exceptions in their respective
Workers' Compensation Acts. Maryland employers are now subject to
increased liability for injuries to their
employees. Potential plaintiffs may
now seek a common law action against
their employers for the deliberate actions of co-employees causing nonphysical injury. In this respect, more
employers may have to defend themselves against claims arising from situations over which they have little
control. Moreover, the small business owner who, although able to
exert some control over the situation,
may not have the financial means to
afford the increased litigation costs of
actions now permitted.
- Steven B. Drucker

Alexander & Alexander v. Evander &
Assoc. , Inc.: COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS VACATES STATE'S
LARGEST PUNITIVE AWARD.
Acting in accordance with a recent
United States Supreme Court opinion,
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland recognized in Alexander &
Alexander v. Evander & Assoc. , Inc. "
596 A.2d 687 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1991), an opportunity to review
Maryland's system of awarding punitive damages. In holding that the
award in Alexander violated due process, the court vacated the award and
remanded for retrial the issues of
whether, and in what amount, punitive damages should have been rendered.
B. Dixon Evander & Associates,
Inc. (" Evander"), an insurance broker, secured medical malpractice insurance for doctors at the University
of Maryland Hospital with an insurer,
Mutual Fire, whose underwriter was
Shand, Morahan and Co. (" Shand" ).
Shand was a subsidiary of another
broker, Alexander & Alexander (" A
& A"). Evander and Shand had a
contract whereby Evander was to be
Shand's exclusive representative for
professional malpractice coverage.
In order to obtain less expensive
malpractice coverage, the hospital secured A & A as its new exclusive
broker in 1985. This decision created
a conflict with Shand's agreement to
underwrite exclusively for A & A.
Aware of the conflict, Shand officials
refused to place any of the hospital's
insurance needs with its carrier except
through Evander. At trial, it was
revealed that A & A officials had
pressured Shand officials to accept
hospital policies through A & A in
spite of Shand's promise to Evander.
Evander claimed that A & A had
tortiously interfered with his contract
with Shand, thereby depriving him of
commissions from that contract.
Evander additionally alleged that A &
A had conspired to harm his business
reputation. Testimony at trial revealed that an A & A vice-president

had a personal dislike for Evander and
that the official held a grudge against
Evander and had vowed to put him out
of business. The jury awarded
$250,052 in compensatory damages
to Evander against all defendants as
well as $40 million in punitive damagesagainstA&A. AlthoughEvander
was also awarded $70,104 in punitive
damages against Shand, he dismissed
that claim. On A & A's motion,
Baltimore City Circuit Judge Meyer
Cardin reduced the punitive damages
against A & A to $12.5 million, added
to the compensatory damages, and left
the rest of the verdict intact.
A & A's appeal to the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland centered
around the punitive damages award.
Specifically, A & A complained that
the award violated both federal and
state requirements for due process of
law, based on the amount of the award
and the lack of relation to "proper
standards."
A & A premised its
argument on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Pacific Mut. Life Ins.
v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991).
In Haslip, the justices turned back
a broad-based challenge to punitive
damages, pointing out that they have
" long been a part of traditional state
tort law." Alexander, 596 A. 2d at 705
(quoting Silkwood v. Kerr McGee,
464 U.S. 238 (1984». The Court,
however, did note that punitive damage awards are subject to due process
considerations and warned that states
must provide sufficient standards to
guide juries and judges in their decisions on when punitive damages should
be awarded. These standards, the
Court opined, must include proper
jury instruction and sufficient judicial
review of the award. Alexander, 596
A.2d at 705-06 (citing Haslip, 111 S.
Ct. at 1044 (1991». The court took
this opportunity to determine whether
Maryland law on punitive damages
complied with the implicit standards
from Haslip: guidance for the jury's
and the court's discretion and judicial
review of jury verdicts.
Because Maryland's highest court

had never promulgated a list of standards for punitive damages, the court
turned to Maryland case law to determine whether Maryland courts had
ever articulated the principles of punitive damages. The court concluded
that the principles expressed in Maryland decisions were sufficient to guide
juries and judges. The court first
noted the court of appeals holding that
punitive damages " are to punish the
wrongdoer, to teach him not to repeat
his wrongful conduct and to deter
others from engaging in the same
conduct," Alexander, 596 A.2d at 708
(citing Wedeman v. City Chevrolet
Co., 366 A.2d 7, 12 (1976». With
regard to when a court is to impose
such damages, the court noted another
court of appeals decision in which
punitive damages would be imposed
only where there is " outrageous conduct." Id. at 708 (citing Nast v.
Lockett, 539 A.2d 1113, 1116 (1988».
As to judicial review of punitive
damages, the court found that the
circuit courts in Maryland have broad
discretion to review jury verdicts for
excessiveness. The court acknowledged, however, that" [a)s a general
rule in Maryland, 'the question of
whether a verdict is excessive is not
open on appeal,''' Id. at 709 (citing
Continental Gas Co. v. Mirabile, 449
A.2d 1176, 1184 (1982», and that the
Maryland appellate courts have never
tampered with the amount of an award.
After reviewing Maryland procedures for punitive damage awards and
deeming them sufficient, the court
recognized that Haslip required courts
to look further. The court stated the
following:
[i)ffaced with a punitive award
that was entered upon proper
procedure but which nonetheless contravenes due process
because it is all out of proportion to both the harm caused
and the perniciousness of the
conduct, we could not, on the
ground of judicial impotence,
allow the unconstitutional
award to stand.

Id. at 710. Armed with the additional
power of review extended by Haslip,
the court analyzed the award against A
& A. The court was troubled by the
fact that Evander had not presented
evidence of A & A's net wealth and
ability to pay, and that the jury had not
been advised of the punishment and
deterrent purposes of punitive damages.
Several other factors influenced
the court's holding that the $12.5
million punitive award against A & A
violated due process. The court first
pointed out that the award against A &
A was the largest ever rendered by a
Maryland court. The nearest in amount
was $7.5 million awarded in Potomac
Electricv. Smith, 558A.2d 768 (1989).
In addition, the court believed the
award to be far in excess of the actual
harm caused to Evander. The court
noted that the award was nearly fifty
times the essentially liquidated compensatory damages and observed that
until the very end of the case, Evander
himself had not sought more than $5
million.
Finall y, the court decided that A &
A's conduct, while" opprobrious, ..
. excessive, ill-motivated, and . . .
stupid," did not rate" high on the scale
of reprehensibility." Alexander, 596
A.2d at 711. The court arrived at this
conclusion after comparing A & A's
case with Potomac Electric, where an
electric utility had allowed a high
voltage wire to remain downed in an
area frequented by children, resulting
in the electrocution of a child. The
court in that case found that the utility
company's wanton conduct justified a
$7.5 million punitive award. Observing that A & A had neither endangered
public health or safety nor engaged in
I ife-threatening activity, the court held
that the award did not comport with
due process. Alexander, 596 A.2d at
711.
Following tradition, the court
chose not to alter the award. While the
court recognized that .. the occasion
may arise where an appellate reduction may be the most appropriate solu22.2/The Law Forum - 25

tion," it declined to find that situation embodied in Federal Rule of Evidence
had just finished burning the
in Alexander. Id. at 711. The court 801 (d) (2) (0) and abandoned the tradistring from the jack wheels;
instead vacated the punitive award and tional common law approach which
and
remanded for retrial the questions of required" speaking authority" before
5) Grimes believed the cause
whether, and in what amount, A & A's the statement was considered an adof the fire was related to
conduct justified a punitive damages . mission of the principal.
Johnson's use of the acetylene
B & K Rentals and Sales Co. (liB
award. The court also suggested spetorch ...
cific instructions for the jury on re- & K") stored equipment used in its Id. at 641.
mand.
business of renting scaffolding and
The trial court excluded both
The Alexander opinion provides seating for public gatherings in a porStallings' and Klasmeier's reports.
fresh insight on how the Maryland tion of a warehouse owned by UniverThe
court ruled that the reports were
state courts should determine punitive
sal Leaf Tobacco Co. (" Universal "). inadmissible because each relied on
damages. Though the court determined that the standards set by case B & K brought an action for damages Grimes' hearsay statements, and neilaw were sufficient, it also acknowl- against Universal, contending that the ther qualified as admissions of a party
edged that Maryland courts in the past negligence of Universal and its em- opponent or as part of the res gestae
may have limited themselves too much ployees caused a fire which resulted in exception. Id. at 642. The court of
in reviewing punitive damage awards. a substantial amount of damage to B & special appeals affirmed. The Court
With the Haslip decision in mind, the K's equipment. Only two Universal of Appeals of Maryland granted cercourt in Alexander gave appellate courts employees were present and working tiorari to consider the laws under
a green light for considering due pro- at the warehouse on the day of the fire,
which evidence of admissions of party
cess when examining punitive damage one of whom died in the fire. B & K
opponents
were admissible.
awards.
never deposed or subpoenaed the surThe court began its analysis by reThe Alexander case also serves to
viving
employee,
Leonard
Grimes.
examining
the development of
remind attorneys and judges of the
The
parties
disputed
both
the
availMaryland's
case
law on vicarious adimportance of jury instructions for
ability
of
the
surviving
employee
as
a
missions. The court noted that Marypunitive damage awards. Juries must
be told that punitive damages serve to witness and B & K's efforts to locate land courts traditionally implemented
punish wrongdoers and deter others him at the time of the trial.
an evidentiary standard based on
from similar conduct. Juries need to
The case turned on the testimony agency law. Under this traditional
be aware of the standards for actual of an expert witness, Lieutenant Ken- test, the court required an agent to
malice and other factors, such as the neth J. Klasmeier, a fire investigator
have" speaking authority" before his
wrongdoer's net worth and ability to with the Anne Arundel County Fire
statements qualified as an admission
pay in order to make an informed
Department. Lt. Klasmeier based his of the principal. Id. at 643 (citing
decision.
testimony on a written report he re- Brown v. Hebb, 175 A. 602, 607 (Md.
- Catherine E. Head ceived from another Anne Arundel 1934».
Fire Department Investigator, LieuThe court recognized the probB & K Rentals and Sales Co. v. tenant James Stallings. Lt. Stallings lems inherent in the application of the
Universal Leaf Tobacco Co. : MARY-based his report, regarding his inves- traditional test of agency law as an
LAND ABANDONS SPEAKING tigations of the origin and cause of the evidentiary standard. The court
AUTHORITY REQUIREMENT fire, primarily on Grimes' statements pointed out that the narrow formula of
AND" RES GESTAE" APPROACH at the scene of the fire. Grimes told admissibility under the traditional test
AND BINDS PRINCIPAL BY Lt. Stallings that:
was problematic because it" frequently
AGENT'SSTATEMENTSPURSU1) Johnson and he were the
caused courts to exclude the agent's
ANT TO F.R.E. 80Hd)(2l(D).
only two people working at
highly probative statement on the
In B & K Rentals and Sales Co. v.
the warehouse at the time of
theory that the employer had not auUniversal Leaf Tobacco Co., 596 A.2d
the fire;
thorized the agent to make damaging
640 (Md. 1991), the Court of Appeals
2) Grimes had lit an acetylene
remarks about him ... Id. at 643. (quotof Maryland held that a statement of a
torch for Johnson a couple of
ing 4 J. Weinstein & M. Berger,
party opponent's agent, which conhours before the fire;
Weinstein's Evidence, § 801(d)(2)
cerns a matter within the scope of
3) Johnson was using the torch
(0)[01] at 219 (1988».
agency or employment and is made
to burn strings caught in the
The court next considered
during the existence of that relationjack wheels of a wooden dolly;
Maryland's expansion of the tradiship, may constitute an admission by
4) Grimes heard a popping
tionally narrow formula of admissibilthe party opponent. By so ruling, the
noise and saw smoke coming
ity through the adoption of the res
court of appeals adopted the principle
from the area where Johnson
gestae exception to the hearsay rule.
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